Transaction Search Form: please type in any of the fields below.
Date: April 30, 2024 Tue
Time: 3:39 am
Time: 3:39 am
Results for illicit crops
6 results foundAuthor: Cardenas, Mauricio Title: Does Crime Lower Growth? Evidence from Colombia Summary: Many analysts consider that lack of security is a major obstacle to growth in Colombia. This paper identifies a structural downturn in economic growth — of nearly two percentage points per year — as a result of the increase in illicit crops and crime rates after 1980. A decline in total factor productivity has been the key channel linking crime and economic growth. Political upheavals and high levels of inequality and poverty motivated the adoption of a new constitution in 1991. The constitution mandated additional fiscal expenditures to curb social tensions. Major progress has been made in terms of public safety and, to a lesser extent, in the provision of health and education. However, long‐run growth will continue to be constrained by inadequate transport infrastructure and low international trade volumes. Details: Washington, DC: World Bank, 2008. 56p. Source: Internet Resource: Working Paper No. 30: Accessed April 28, 2011 at: http://www.growthcommission.org/storage/cgdev/documents/gcwp030web.pdf Year: 2008 Country: Colombia URL: http://www.growthcommission.org/storage/cgdev/documents/gcwp030web.pdf Shelf Number: 121559 Keywords: Economics and Crime (Colombia)Illicit CropsPoverty |
Author: Vargas Meza, Ricardo Title: Drugs, Armed Conflict and Peace. How does the agreement on drugs between the government and the FARC help to put an end to the armed conflict in Colombia? Summary: This policy briefing analyses the results of the partial agreement on drugs reached at the talks being held in Havana between the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, FARC, and the Colombian government. analysis is based on the joint communique issued on 16 May 2014, the eve of the first round of the presidential election in Colombia. Following a brief introduction to the drugs issue in the broader framework of the peace talks, the briefing looks at how the subject of illicit crops, drug use and trafficking is dealt with in the agreement. It concludes with an assessment of the progress that the agreement represents in terms of the link between drugs and armed conflict. Key Points - The diversity of participants in the war who are involved in drug trafficking has led to a complex scenario in which the guerrilla groups are only one part of the problem. The criminal economy is able to continue operating regardless of who controls security in the producer regions. - The territorial approach that the agreement rhetorically claims to adopt is weak. It is not based on an integrated view of the territory and reduces it to the coca situation. A genuinely territorial approach would open the door to participation by rural settlers, indigenous and African-descent communities and give them a say in their territory's future. - The agreement is a ratification of the ongoing relevance of the current approach to drugs, which is based on prohibition. In this case, the objective is the total elimination of both coca and drug trafficking. To insist on "eradicating drug trafficking" is to repeat old recipes in new packaging because it leaves intact the very mechanism that makes the drug trade competitive: continued prohibition. - The agreement ignores the significant level of progress made in processes that have become stronger and currently represent a critical mass in favour of a regulation scenario. These processes include the development of harm reduction models. These models are based on the understanding that drugs must be accepted as a reality that must be lived with, while preventing or minimising the harm that drugs may cause to users. - The agreement fails to envisage a strategic approach to the problem, including the seeking of commitments from other countries to rethink the current policy on drugs. Details: Amsterdam: Transnational Institute, 2014. 6p. Source: Internet Resource: Drug Policy Briefings Nr 42: Accessed November 25, 2014 at: http://www.tni.org/sites/www.tni.org/files/download/dpb_42_eng_072014.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Colombia URL: http://www.tni.org/sites/www.tni.org/files/download/dpb_42_eng_072014.pdf Shelf Number: 134252 Keywords: Armed ConflictDrug Abuse and Addiction (Colombia)Drug EnforcementDrug TraffickingIllicit Crops |
Author: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. Regional Office for East Asia and the Pacific. ASEAN Title: Evidence for enhancing resilience to opium poppy cultivation in Shan State, Myanmar: Implications for alternative development, peace, and stability Summary: In 2016, the annual village survey was conducted in 591 villages in Shan state, the main opium poppy cultivating area in Myanmar. An independent area estimation was not part of the survey this year; however, UNODC expanded largely on the socio‐economic analysis of opium cultivation in the context of the UN Guiding Principles on Alternative Development and achieving the Sustainable Development Goals. Opium poppy continues to be an important part of the Shan State economy About 1 in 10 households in the villages surveyed in Shan State are directly involved in opium poppy cultivation. The share of villages that cultivate opium poppy and the share of households within these villages that participate have both decreased over the past year. However, opium poppy is still integral to the state’s economy, and there are many households who depend on poppy cultivation for their livelihood. Fewer villages and farmers are growing opium poppy There has been a reduction in the number of villages and households involved in opium poppy cultivation; however, accompanied by an increase in the average area under cultivation per household. The average area under opium poppy cultivation increased from 0.4 hectares per household in 2015 to 0.6 hectares in 2016. This concentration of cultivation confirms earlier observations. The average income in opium poppy villages is higher, but the positive impact on household finances is largely offset by higher costs of living The average annual household income is higher in villages where opium poppy is cultivated (US$2,261) than in non‐opium poppy villages (US$1,839). Farmers in opium poppy villages, however, were primarily buying food with the income from poppy cultivation. Moreover, there are several indications that people living in villages where opium poppy is grown face higher living costs than their peers in non‐opium poppy villages. Many opium poppy villages in East and North Shan are located in remote or highly inaccessible areas with low infrastructure coverage. For example, very few opium poppy villages have asphalt roads, and somewhat fewer of these villages have clinics than non‐growing villages (although village clinics are rare throughout East and North Shan, with such facilities operating in less than one in five villages). The nearest outside clinic also took twice as long to reach from opium poppy villages. The lack of clinics and roads means that health and transportation costs are higher for farmers in opium poppy villages in East and North Shan. Farmers in opium poppy villages face challenges in relying only on licit sources of income Across Shan State, cash crops – licit or illicit – are the main source of income for farmers. In non‐ opium poppy villages, cash crops, primarily rice, were cited as the primary source of income by nearly half of all surveyed village headmen. Before deciding to substitute opium poppy with licit crops, farmers would need to consider some challenges. Access to local markets for agricultural products is critical. None of the opium poppy cultivating villages had local markets, whereas 8 per cent of the non‐opium poppy villages had them. Moreover, the nearest market took more than two hours to reach on foot from opium poppy villages, compared to just under an hour from non‐ opium poppy villages. Daily wages were also markedly lower in poppy‐cultivating villages; the difference was greatest for male workers. These challenges make it more difficult to earn a living from licit activities in opium poppy villages than in villages where opium poppy is not grown. Distinct motivations for growing opium poppy in South Shan Several sustainable development indicators show a different situation in South Shan in comparison to East and North Shan. Villages which cultivate opium poppy in South Shan still have low levels of development but their characteristics are different from those in East and North Shan. In South Shan, the average income is higher and the infrastructure better than in East and North Shan, and more people are able to access salaried jobs, which are usually better remunerated and more stable. Moreover, according to the village headmen, the majority of households in South Shan, regardless of their opium poppy cultivation status, do not need to resort to drastic strategies to cope with food insecurity, such as reducing the number of meals per day, in contrast to East and North Shan. The higher incomes, better infrastructure and food security status in South Shan may indicate that opium poppy cultivation is primarily driven by capital accumulation, while in East and North Shan, cultivation seems to be more closely linked with subsistence needs. However, the relatively high income inequality among farmers in opium poppy villages in South Shan may suggest that there are a number of farmers who are not able to make ends meet also there. People in opium poppy villages are more dependent on forest resources, and more prone to experiencing environmental and climate‐related challenges Many households across Shan State depend on wood from local forests for cooking, particularly in villages where opium poppy is cultivated. More village headmen from opium poppy villages reported declining local forest quality in the last two years than their peers from non‐opium poppy villages. The quality of the drinking water is another concern, and again, the problem is more pronounced in opium poppy villages. There are also indications that opium poppy villages seem to be somewhat more affected by climate related shocks, like frost or drought, which could decrease crop yields and increase the price of food. Details: Thailand: UNODC - ASEAN, 2017. 84p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 3, 2017 at: http://www.unodc.org/documents/southeastasiaandpacific//Publications/2017/2016_Myanmar_Shan_Opium_Poppy_web.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Asia URL: http://www.unodc.org/documents/southeastasiaandpacific//Publications/2017/2016_Myanmar_Shan_Opium_Poppy_web.pdf Shelf Number: 144703 Keywords: Illegal DrugsIllicit CropsOpium Poppy Cultivation Socioeconomic Conditions and Crime |
Author: Londono, Ana Maria Ibanez Title: Abandoning Coffee under the Threat of Violence and the Presence of Illicit Crops. Evidence from Colombia Summary: This paper explores the importance of the risk of violence on the decision making of rural households, using a unique panel data set for Colombian coffee-growers. We identify two channels. First, we examine the direct impact of conflict on agricultural production through the change in the percentage of the farm allocated to coffee. Second, we explore how conflict generates incentives to substitute from legal agricultural production to illegal crops. Following Dercon and Christiaensen (2011), we develop a dynamic consumption model where economic risk and the risk of violence are explicitly included. Theoretical results are tested using a parametric and semi-parametric approach. We find a significant negative effect of the risk of violence and the presence of illegal crops on the decision to continue coffee production and on the percentage of the farm allocated to coffee. Results are robust after controlling for endogeneity bias and after relaxing the normality assumption. Details: Brighton, UK: HiCN Households in Conflict Network, 2013. 44p. Source: Internet Resource: HiCN Working Paper 150: Accessed May 24, 2017 at: http://www.hicn.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/HiCN-WP-150.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Colombia URL: http://www.hicn.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/HiCN-WP-150.pdf Shelf Number: 145750 Keywords: Armed ConflictConflict Related ViolenceIllegal CropsIllicit Crops |
Author: Mansfield, David Title: Stirring Up the Hornet's Nest: How the Population of Rural Helmand view the current Counterinsurgency Campaign Summary: A central tenet of US counter-insurgency during the Bush and Obama administrations was "winning the hearts and minds" of the population. This was termed a "population-centred" approach and was informed by a strategy of "clear, hold and build," in which coalition and Afghan forces would clear insurgents from a given territory, then hold it while their influence was mitigated, and invest in the development and governance of the area. The assumption was that such a strategy would gain the support of the population. Between 2008 and 2012, Helmand province was a focal point for just such a population-centred counterinsurgency effort. It was estimated that between 2009 and 2011, more than US$648 million was spent in the province in tandem with an inflow of over 20,000 US marines, as well as UK, Danish, and Afghan military forces.2 As early as late 2009, the district of Nawa Barakzai, just south of the provincial capital of Lashkar Gah, became an emblem of counter-insurgency efforts and cited as an exemplar of the merits of "putting the population first." The approach was then replicated in the neighbouring districts of Nad e Ali and Marjah when over 3,000 US marines, 1,200 soldiers from the UK and 4,400 Afghan forces deployed under Operation Moshtarak in February 2010, while millions of dollars were spent on physical and social infrastructure. Levels of violence declined, but any gains were short-lived following the departure of international military forces in the summer of 2014, which diminished the mobility of the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF). Development investments in central Helmand also dwindled along with the associated donor funds. By the fall of 2016, the insurgency had once again made major inroads, ANDSF had abandoned security checkpoints in Nad e Ali, Marjah and Nawa Barakzai and there were few rural development projects. In the wake of the Trump administration's debates over the future of US assistance to Afghanistan, a new counter-insurgency strategy-the South Asia Policy-came into play. Armed with a change in presidential authorities that supported a more aggressive military position against insurgent forces and those believed to be financing them, the United States Forces Afghanistan (USFOR-A), in the words of its commander General Nicholson, would take "the fight to the enemy in all its dimensions." This paper documents how this new strategy is perceived by the rural population of central Helmand, both in the canal-irrigated areas of Marjah, Nawa Barakzai, Nahre Seraj and Nad Ali and in the former desert areas north of the Boghra canal. It is based on the results of fieldwork in rural Helmand in May 2018 and high-resolution imagery. The paper emphasises how, by the turn of 2018, central Helmand was once again a battleground in which the population was not the prize-to coin the phrase used by proponents of population-centric counterinsurgency-but the perceived victims of a campaign of protracted violence that many farmers believe is at the behest of US and Afghan military forces. The paper also suggests that antagonism toward the government and the uptick in violence were exacerbated by a campaign of air strikes targeting heroin labs, a dramatic downturn in opium prices and a worsening economic situation. The allegations of corruption frequently levelled at Afghan officials and security forces without any notable investments in physical or social infrastructure only serve to further alienate the rural population from a government that is thought to only "fill its own pockets." The paper concludes that, in this environment, the US and Afghan government forces may be able to clear parts of central Helmand of insurgent forces, and even hold the area for a time, but there is little to suggest this strategy will win the support of the population. Finally, recommendations are offered. Details: Kabul: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, 2018. 30p. Source: Internet Resource: Issues Paper: Accessed November 16, 2018 at: https://areu.org.af/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/1814E-STIRRING-UP-THE-HORNET%E2%80%99S-NEST.pdf Year: 2018 Country: Afghanistan URL: https://areu.org.af/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/1814E-STIRRING-UP-THE-HORNET%E2%80%99S-NEST.pdf Shelf Number: 153494 Keywords: Illegal DrugsIllicit CropsOpium Poppy EradicationPoppy Cultivation |
Author: Mansfield, David Title: High and Dry: Poppy cultivation and the future of those that reside in the former desert areas of South West Afghanistan Summary: The deserts of southwestern Afghanistan have been transformed. Land that was once dry and strewn with rocks, has been cleared, irrigated, and planted with crops by an influx of new settlers. The pace of the settlement of the former desert areas of the southwest is such that by 2018 there was an additional 357,885 hectares of agricultural land compared to 2002, and possibly as many as 3.6 million people residing there. And at a time when the north of the country is experiencing a dramatic drought, a further 29,000 hectares of land came under cultivation in the former deserts of the southwest between 2017 and 2018. In fact, more land was cultivated in the former desert north of the Boghra Canal in Helmand in 2018 than ever before, and there were further signs of migration into the area from farmers looking to escape the uptick in violence in the canal irrigated area following the government's efforts to recapture parts of Nad Ali. The change is such that the former desert lands north of the of the Boghra in Helmand are almost indistinguishable from those areas to the south where US$ 75 million, much of it provided by the United States, was invested in more than 200 km of irrigation canals over a three-decade period. Increased access to technology, relatively low land prices-and at least in the area north of the Boghra Canal-a recovery of opium yields-continue to draw people into these former desert lands. The population has dug in. The markets, that once straddled the Boghra canal, and thereby served both the populations of the desert to the north and the irrigated areas to the south, have lost their importance. Permanent markets have been established deep in the former desert area, north of the canal, reflecting the changing face of central Helmand, the growth in the settled population in these former empty spaces, and the increasing purchasing power of those that live there. However, despite these obvious gains the productivity of these former desert places - and thereby the lives of the population that reside there - is precarious. In recent years the uptick in technology such as herbicides and the use of solar technology to power deep wells has helped farmers overcome falling yields and lower production costs. But at the same time these developments pose a threat to agricultural sustainability and the livelihoods of the population in these former desert areas. The ground water that the area relies on is falling at an increasing rate with the growth in solar-powered technology and there are signs that it is contaminated with nitrates. This paper draws on detailed fieldwork and imagery in 2018 to document the changes in the lives and livelihoods of the population in these rapidly expanding former desert areas of the southwest. It traces changes in agricultural practice, governance and the experiences of the population, both men and women, to illustrate how fragile life is for those living in these former desert areas and the vulnerability of the population. The paper is pioneering in its efforts to document the lives and livelihoods of women in these former desert areas where prevailing levels of insecurity, the tradition of seclusion, and the challenges of conducting fieldwork in the remote former desert spaces mean that this is a population group whose voices are rarely heard. The paper is divided into six sections. The first section outlines the methodology used to conduct research in such difficult and insecure terrain. The second section examines the contrasting histories of settlement of two former desert areas: the area north of the Boghra canal in Helmand and Bakwa, some 100 kilometers to the northwest. The third section looks at the changing face of governance in these former desert areas. It highlights just how incidental the government is to those that live in places like Bakwa and north of the Boghra and provides evidence of the insurgency's growing influence over the population's way of life in matters of security, justice, education, and even environmental policy. The fourth section details agricultural production over the winter of 2017-18 and highlights the critical role that opium production plays in the economic viability of these former desert areas. The fifth section documents the experiences of those that live in these former desert areas, with a particular focus on those women that migrate to the area north of the Boghra Canal on a seasonal basis. Finally, a conclusion is offered. Details: Kabul: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, 2018. 46p. Source: Internet Resource: Issues Paper: Accessed November 16, 2018 at: https://areu.org.af/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/1817E-High-and-Dry-Poppy-cultivation-and-the-future-of-those-that-reside-in-the-former-desert-areas-of-South-West-Afghanistan.pdf Year: 2018 Country: Afghanistan URL: https://areu.org.af/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/1817E-High-and-Dry-Poppy-cultivation-and-the-future-of-those-that-reside-in-the-former-desert-areas-of-South-West-Afghanistan.pdf Shelf Number: 153495 Keywords: Illegal Drugs Illicit Crops Opium Poppy Cultivation |